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INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to contribute to this celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Federal Rules. As one who has been something of a rulemaking
insider for over twenty percent of the seventy-five years since the Federal
Rules came into effect, I suppose I incline towards being an apologist—at least
regarding recent developments.
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I intend to focus mainly on the introduction and evolution of broad discovery. In part, that’s because discovery has been an almost constant focus
of rulemaking for forty years and also is the most acute pressure point in
the acidic relations the United States has had with the rest of the world due
to distinct procedural arrangements. In addition, our broad discovery can
serve as an avatar for the most aggressive visions of the peculiar American
institution of private litigation as a force for good or evil. Not surprisingly,
my general view is that the rulemakers have sought (fairly successfully) to
steer a middle course between the most aggressive supporters and critics.
Today, though, it may be that Silicon Valley is the source of greater challenges for discovery rules than either camp of critics.
I take my theme for this Essay1 from Edward Bellamy. In 1888, fifty
years before the Federal Rules went into effect, Bellamy published a book
called Looking Backward.2 Many today have never read it, perhaps never
even heard of it. But when it appeared, it was an instant and enduring
sensation. According to Erich Fromm,
[I]t is one of the few books ever published that created almost immediately
on its appearance a political mass movement. Between 1890 and 1891 one
hundred and sixty-five ‘Bellamy Clubs’ sprang up all over the United States,
devoted to the discussion and propagation of the aims expressed in Looking
Backward. The Populist Party, which at its peak attracted over one million
votes throughout the States, was to a large extent influenced by Bellamy’s
ideas, and got many of its votes from his adherents.3

I invoke Bellamy because his book provides a contrast for our reflections
in this symposium. The book is a first-person description by a wealthy
Bostonian from 1888 who, due to miraculous circumstances, goes to sleep
that year and awakens in 2000 to find himself in an utterly transformed
1 This is an essay in the sense that it deals with a variety of topics that have been exhaustively
discussed in legal literature for a century. I do not intend to try to provide comprehensive citations
for what I say and will often draw on my personal experience as Associate Reporter of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules since 1996. I should emphasize that I speak here solely for
myself and not for anyone else, in particular the Advisory Committee. In addition, I note that this
was written in September 2013, before the public comment period for pending rule amendment
proposals had produced much commentary. There was a great deal of commentary later, and the
amendment proposals were revised.
2 See generally EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (Signet ed., 1960) (1888).
3 Erich Fromm, Foreword to BELLAMY, supra note 2, at vi. Fromm adds that it was the most
popular book in late nineteenth century America after Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Ben-Hur and that
Charles Beard, John Dewey, and Edward Weeks independently listed the book as second on their
rankings of “most influential” nineteenth century books, eclipsed only by Karl Marx’s Das Kapital.
See id. at v.
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Boston. Although the “Robber Baron” epoch into which the narrator was
born was characterized by divisions between rich and poor considerably
starker than those in the United States today, Bellamy’s Boston of 2000 was
completely different. Humanity had finally learned the lessons that the midnineteenth century “rationalists” had urged, and everyone was contented,
well-fed, and well-supported—with retirement at age forty-five. Not only
was there universal health care, but almost all other needs were met, and
people led fulfilled lives. Had he been able to visit to the actual Boston of
2000, Bellamy would surely have been sorely disappointed. The consequences of the Great Recession since then would only deepen his distress.
As Voltaire supposedly said, “the perfect is the enemy of the good,” and
utopians may be the bane of all reformers who operate in the world as it is
rather than as it might be in the imagination of those with uncommon
imaginations. But it seems to me a useful device to reflect on our seventyfive-year experiment with the Federal Rules by thinking about how the
framers of that breakthrough, who almost surely were familiar with Bellamy’s
book, would react to our contemporary litigation world if they could visit it.
Would they be similarly disappointed? My guess is that they would not—
though they would probably be quite surprised by many things that we take
as commonplace.
In this Essay, I first sketch what appear to be the attitudes of the framers.
I then explore what has happened to change litigation since 1938 and
consider the ways in which discovery reform has responded to the challenges
of those developments. Finally, I will explore the new discovery challenges
of the twenty-first century that may justify a reconsideration of some
assumptions about getting “all” the relevant information. I conclude that the
gradual adjustments we have seen and may see are true to the framers’
vision and don’t deserve denunciation, even by those who think some of
them wrong-headed.
I. THE BEGINNINGS
Professor Subrin cogently set the scene for the rulemakers in a 1997
presentation:
Although the drafters did have large cases in mind, I think it is fair to say
that the drafters as a group would be amazed at how immense many cases
now become and how prominent a role discovery plays in that process.
Some things they could not have known: the advent of copying machines
and computers; the huge size of law firms and litigation departments; the
many factors leading to the large overhead of major firms; and the enormous growth and change in substantive law. I think the drafters also would
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have been surprised at the role of civil claims as, to use Professor Hazard’s
words, ‘an integral part of law enforcement in this country . . . [T]he
scope of discovery determines the scope of effective law enforcement in
many fields regulated by law.’4

Regarding discovery, the record confirms what Subrin said. Discovery
surely existed before 1938. There were even treatises about it in the nineteenth century.5 As shown in a three-part study by Dean Langdell in the
1890s, however, the discovery provisions that existed then look now like a
cavalcade of minutiae.6 A comprehensive 1928 examination of the same basic
subject by a young Professor Fleming James, stressing American provisions,
does not appear much different.7 Surely the variety of specific differences
and qualifications that these articles enumerate were important to the
practitioners of the day, but they seem alien to us now.
The Federal Rules broke with that past, enabled by the 1934 adoption of
the Rules Enabling Act, which Professor Burbank has chronicled so ably.8
Although the Enabling Act’s path to adoption was long and tendentious, it
was not much preoccupied with the detail of the rules to be adopted. In
particular, the Enabling Act did not focus on discovery.9 Roscoe Pound’s
famous 1906 speech to the American Bar Association, which many credited
with prompting the reform drive that led to adoption of the Enabling Act
nearly thirty years later, similarly did not focus on discovery, even though it
enumerated myriad reasons why the American public would be dissatisfied
with the administration of justice and particularly criticized extreme
adversarial behavior.10

4 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 743-44 (1998) (quoting REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON THE FEDERAL R ULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reporter, Mar. 30–
31, 1995)). This article was a presentation during the conference on discovery held by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules at Boston College on September 4–5, 1997.
5 See generally EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY (1885)
(examining discovery in English courts).
6 See generally C.C. Langdell, Discovery Under the Judicature Acts, 1873, 1875 (pts. 1–3), 11
HARV. L. REV. 137, 205 (1897), 12 HARV. L. REV. 151 (1898).
7 See generally Fleming James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929).
8 See Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
9 See Subrin, supra note 4, at 692-94.
10 See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906). Many of the causes Pound discussed were universal, such as “the
necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules,” id. at 397, and the “popular impatience of
restraint,” id. at 401-02. Among native propensities, he reported, “the worst feature of American
procedure is the lavish granting of new trials.” Id. at 413. The absence of significant opportunities
for discovery did not seem similarly important to Pound, although he did denounce trial by surprise.
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Everyone recognizes that the post-1938 reality has brought discovery to
the fore. After denouncing “fishing expeditions” in 1911, 11 the Supreme
Court concluded within a decade of the adoption of the Federal Rules that
“the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’” should not prevent discovery.12
In 1965, Professor James published the first edition of his civil procedure
treatise, which continues to thrive to this day under the leadership of
Professor Hazard. In his preface, Professor James explains that a new
treatise was needed because Dean Clark’s code pleading treatise had been
eclipsed by developments in litigation; pleading problems (Clark’s focus)
had yielded in importance to the needs of discovery.13 One “great development” that explained this shift and “changed the face of procedure” was “the
federal rules of civil procedure together with their many state counterparts.”14
II. THE CONTEMPORARY LITIGATION REALITY
“[L]itigation in the federal courts has become a world unimagined in 1938.”
–Arthur Miller15

Since contemporary discovery functions in the broader world of litigation,
it is useful to reflect on some of the distinctive trends that have emerged
since the framers did their groundbreaking work. At least four developments deserve attention: the “heroic model” of litigation in the Civil Rights
era, the rise of private attorneys general, the beginning of mass tort litigation,
and the increase in corporate litigation. Some of them may, indeed, have
depended in part on changes wrought by the Federal Rules. For our purposes,
the key question will be whether discovery played a critical role in this
development.
Discovery surely was identified early on as a source of problems; the 1951
Prettyman Report identified coping with huge volumes of evidence as one
of the hallmarks of “protracted litigation” that judges should strive to
control.16 But as we continue to deal with efforts to constrain over-discovery, it

11
12
13
14

See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE, at v (1st ed. 1965).
Id.; see also id. at 184 (“The federal discovery provisions have been adopted in whole or
substantial part by more states than has any other part of those rules.”).
15 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2010).
16 See Prettyman Report, 13 F.R.D. 62, 74-79 (1951) (referring to “bulk documentary evidence”); see also The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131 (1951) (examining
discovery problems in big cases).
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is useful to remember that the concerns have been with us almost as long as
the Rules.
A. The Heroic Model: Civil Rights Litigation
Brown v. Board of Education was the ultimate symbol of using litigation
to surmount barriers to progress. In a way it has become a cultural icon; “it
is surely the only Supreme Court case that has its own National Historic
Site.”17 Despite its singularity, it is fair to say that such litigation was the
model Professor Chayes contemplated when he examined the procedural
implications of “public law litigation” in his 1976 article.18 For others, such
as Professor Fiss, that sort of litigation was the main or sole legitimate
function of the public court system.19
One way of looking at the middle third of the twentieth century is that
it was a period that persistently aspired toward the sorts of ideals that
Edward Bellamy embraced. Roosevelt’s New Deal, Truman’s Fair Deal,
Kennedy’s New Frontier, and Johnson’s Great Society each had aspects that
Bellamy would have endorsed. But it would be difficult to say that these
aspects always triumphed, and more difficult yet to say that they triumphed
in an environment in which human contentiousness had been put to rest, as
Bellamy foresaw could happen by the end of the twentieth century.
To the contrary, the civil rights legislation that today seems a critical
watershed development on the road toward equality was won only by hardnosed legislative maneuvering by Lyndon Johnson, one of the greatest
maneuverers of them all.20 To a large extent, however, breakthroughs came
17 Reuel E. Schiller, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and Administration in Postwar America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 415, 416 (2008).
18 Professor Chaves recognized that public law litigation was not the only sort of litigation
that fit his new model:

School desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners’ or inmates’ rights
cases come readily to mind as avatars of this new form of litigation. But it would be
mistaken to suppose that it is confined to these areas. Antitrust, securities fraud and
other aspects of the conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations,
union governance, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management—cases in all these fields display in varying degrees
the features of public law litigation.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976).
19 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 30 (1979) (urging that using public courts for mere dispute resolution is “an extravagant
use of public resources”).
20 It is a given that hard political fighting attended enactment of civil rights legislation in the
1950s and 1960s. For a discussion of the legislative horse-trading that led to primary reliance on
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in court, not in legislative halls. Brown v. Board of Education is the most
famous of many court victories, but only one of many.
Whether the framers should have foreseen this role for litigation is
uncertain. By 1949, the problem of “protracted litigation” had prompted the
Judicial Conference to appoint a committee to study these resulting problems of judicial administration.21 When Professor Chayes announced in 1976
that “[w]e are witnessing the emergence of a new model of civil litigation”
because “the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or
statutory policies,” 22 Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell responded that
similar litigation had been around for a long time.23 But as Professor Kagan
has chronicled repeatedly,24 America is unique in the world in turning to its
independent judiciary to make decisions about public policy. One might
ascribe this development to failures of the more political branches of
government, but it surely has contributed to charges of “judicial imperialism.”
As the recent fiftieth anniversary of the March on Washington reminds
us, there is more to be done to achieve the ideals we espouse. But it is
considerably more difficult to say that this “Eyes on the Prize” sort of
litigation looms large in the twenty-first century. The California prison
litigation is a notable example of the continuing power of this form of
litigation.25 But that example is an exception; “structural” litigation has
largely disappeared from our courtrooms and from the headlines. In part,
one may ascribe the decline of blockbuster litigation to more “careful” or
“restrictive” attitudes towards class certification embodied in the Supreme

private litigation rather than agency action to enforce Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see
SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
IN THE UNITED STATES 94-128 (2010). For discussion of the political fights that accompanied
enactment of the rather toothless 1957 civil rights legislation, see generally ROBERT A. CARO,
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE, 895-989 (2002). For
additional discussion on these issues, see, for example, TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963–65 (1998); CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
21 The resulting report, the Prettyman Report, supra note 16, was published in 1951.
22 Chayes, supra note 18, at 1282, 1284.
23 Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Reform Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
24 See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001).
25 See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). Professor Issacharoff has labeled this
case “the most significant class action litigation of the past decade.” Samuel Issacharoff, Class
Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 375 (2012).
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Court’s recent Wal-Mart26 and Comcast27 decisions. These cases highlight the
ongoing difficulty of fitting aggregation within our adversarial litigation
structure.28
To a considerable degree, however, it may also be that society has moved
beyond the structural injunction model. What we are told is the “new” civil
rights history has as its chief characteristics “decentering the Supreme
Court, Brown v. Board of Education, and the NAACP’s campaign for school
desegregation.”29 One need not claim that we have achieved a “color blind”
society to expect that discrimination litigation will increasingly depend on
individual lawsuits for individual relief instead of mega-lawsuits for mega-relief.
As Professor Farhang recognizes in the first sentence of his path-breaking
book, The Litigation State, employment discrimination lawsuits are the
largest category of civil actions in the federal courts after prisoner petitions.30
Those thousands of cases are overwhelmingly individual suits, rather than
massive class actions. For American litigation, this trend seems to be the
wave of the present, and perhaps also the future. That is not to say litigation
today is not heroic, but it is not heroic on a scale comparable to the heroic
era.
B. The Private Attorney General Model
The civil rights litigator has been displaced by a new hero (or villain,
according to one’s view)—the private attorney general. As Professor
Rubenstein has chronicled, the expression “private attorney general” first
appeared only after the Federal Rules went into effect,31 so it seems unlikely

26 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (overturning certification of a
class of more than one million present and former female employees of Wal-Mart asserting claims
of endemic gender discrimination).
27 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (overturning certification of a class
of cable television subscribers in an antitrust case).
28 For discussion, see generally Richard Marcus, Still Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 557 (2012) (exploring enduring tensions of aggregating claims).
29 Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312,
2320 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS L AWYER (2013)).
30 FARHANG, supra note 20, at 3.
31 William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2130 n.2 (2004) (citing the Supreme Court’s first use of the term in a 1943
dissent, and “Judge Jerome Frank’s original use of the phrase in a Second Circuit decision
[Associate Industries of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943)] rendered several months
earlier”).
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that the framers could have foreseen this idea—although qui tam and other
devices offered analogies.32
But the original idea of a private attorney general has certainly spread,
perhaps partly as a result of a legislative compromise that looks different in
retrospect than it did at the time and explains why a civil rights suit today is
more likely to be an individual action than a class action. As Professor
Farhang has detailed, debates in the Senate over enforcement of Title VII
held up the passage of that anti-discrimination legislation in 1964.33 Liberal
proponents of the bill wanted the chief enforcer to be the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but they needed Republican votes to
pass the legislation. The Republicans, in turn, were extremely worried that
the EEOC would resemble the National Labor Relations Board, which the
business community viewed as siding almost reflexively with unions.
Similarly zealous pro-employee action by the EEOC was anathema to them.
So the Republicans insisted on making private suits by employees the chief
method of enforcement.34 The liberal proponents of the bill were reluctant
to permit this shift, but eventually had no choice.
The liberals changed their minds about the private enforcement model
rather quickly, and installed it in a wide variety of new legislation during
the 1960s and 1970s. To measure the importance of the private attorney
general idea, Professor Rubenstein used Westlaw references to the private
attorney concept, finding a huge increase starting in the 1970s. This was not
because of the “heroic” litigation described above: “the phrase explodes in
the 1970s not because of public law litigation but because it takes root in
new attorneys’ fees statutes and doctrines. Once loosed as a matter of
money, the private attorney general concept’s diffusion was limited only by
the imagination of lawyers seeking attorneys’ fees.”35 But the courts were
not authorized to provide this incentive on their own. In 1975, the Supreme
Court recognized that “Congress has opted to rely heavily on private
enforcement to implement public policy” while holding that federal judges
had no authority to award attorneys’ fees in the absence of a statutory
provision for them.36 Congress responded swiftly with the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.37
32 See id. at 2134 n.26 (citing ways in which private citizens assisted in the enforcement of
criminal laws throughout American history).
33 See FARHANG, supra note 20, at 94-128.
34 Id.
35 Rubenstein, supra note 31, at 2136.
36 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975).
37 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
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The statutory model that fuels this activity often includes minimum
recoveries as well as attorneys’ fee awards to prompt private enforcement.
The setup can magnify both fees and enforcement impact when litigation is
packaged as a class action. A recent example involves theft of a computer
from a medical office in California. Because the computer had records of
four million patients on its hard drive and California’s Confidentiality of
Medical Information Act provides nominal damages of $1,000 per individual
for negligently released data, the theft could lead to a $4 billion liability.38
Legislators who offer the inducement of a minimum recovery probably do
not think about the class action wrinkle. That surely seems to have been the
case with the federal Truth in Lending Act; Congress eventually cabined
class action exposure under that statute.39 Efforts to use class actions under
similar statues have met a mixed reception in the courts.40
38 See Scott Graham, Court to Weigh Price Tag for Data Breach, RECORDER, Jan. 28, 2013, at 1
(describing this litigation).
39 See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012)) (setting a ceiling of $100,000 or 1% of creditor’s
net worth for awards in class actions). The maximum amount was later raised to $500,000. See
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 257, 260 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012)).
40 Recent class actions asserting failure to comply with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) requirement that a retailer block all but the last four digits of a credit card
number illustrate the potential magnitude of damage awards in class actions involving a statutory
minimum recovery. In Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010), the
court reversed a district judge who ruled that a class action would not be “superior” within the
meaning of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because the defendant acted in good faith and should not
face a liability of between $29 million and $290 million. Id. at 710, 723-24.
Notwithstanding this appellate directive, in Rowden v. Pacific Parking Systems, Inc., 282 F.R.D.
581 (C.D. Cal. 2012), a district judge in the Ninth Circuit refused to certify a class action in a
FACTA suit, citing congressional history describing hundreds of suits filed charging technical
violations. Id. at 583-84. Plaintiff claimed that the municipal parking lot operator violated FACTA
because parking receipts included the expiration date of credit cards—information that should not
have appeared on tickets. Id. at 582-83. Judge Carney reasoned:

Mr. Martin seeks $15 million from a small municipality for its alleged FACTA
violations. Nobody in Mr. Martin’s proposed class, however, has ever experienced any
of the harm for which FACTA was enacted to protect against. Moreover, after learning
of the possible FACTA violations, Laguna Beach eventually took corrective measures.
There is no evidence to suggest that Laguna Beach acted maliciously or in bad faith.
Nevertheless, Mr. Martin demands that Laguna Beach defend itself in a time-consuming
and expensive class action. But to do so could severely limit Laguna Beach’s ability to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the city.
Laguna Beach does not have unlimited resources to participate in contentious
class discovery, extensive law and motion, and a prolonged trial. Nor does Laguna
Beach have the financial wherewithal to satisfy and survive an adverse $15 million
judgment. Indeed, $15 million is twice the balance of Laguna Beach’s general fund reserves
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More generally, the bloom has come somewhat off the rose for this form
of litigation as well, even though the litigation remains commonplace.
Trying to determine whether it is effective in achieving enforcement goals is
beyond the scope of this paper; as Professor Lemos has written, there is a
“vast literature” on the choice between public and private enforcement.41 As
she has written more recently, the public enforcement alternative raises
some serious questions.42 Meanwhile, others have launched attacks on the
use of the class action as a method of enforcing public norms,43 prompting
Professor Redish to characterize this attorney activity as “capitalistic
socialism.”44
There may be a division on the Supreme Court about whether to foster
or neuter this form of litigation. The Court’s starting point, of course, was
implying private causes of action when Congress did not itself authorize
them, most famously in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, which held that private parties
could sue for losses caused by violations of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.45 By the 1970s, the Court had become
more circumspect about implying private causes of action,46 but it had not

and more than this year’s entire budget for the city’s police department. Satisfying a
$15 million judgment will compromise Laguna Beach’s ability to respond to emergencies and provide necessary public services. In particular, the areas affected will include
payment of workers’ compensation and employee medical insurance claims, response
to natural disasters, and the provision of vital municipal services. The Court is at a
loss to understand how Mr. Martin can seriously suggest that it is ‘fair’ to subject Laguna Beach to such burdensome class litigation and expose the city to such ruinous liability.
Id. at 587 (footnotes and citations omitted). The judge distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Bateman (described above) as involving a “billion-dollar movie theater company [that] . . . print[ed]
receipts displaying eight digits of consumers’ credit card numbers.” Id. at 587-88 n.9.
It is perhaps not surprising to find judges resisting such draconian results.
41 See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 782 n.1
(2011).
42 See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012) (exploring the various possible difficulties with relying on
attorneys general to enforce public norms rather than leaving the task to private litigants).
43 See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1441 (2005) (arguing that state attorneys general are preferable enforcers
because they are not responding to profit motive and are subject to constraints that do not affect
private attorneys pursuing fee awards).
44 See Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of
Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 64 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
45 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
46 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81-85 (1975) (limiting implied private causes of action to
statutes that contain indicia that Congress intended to authorize such claims, and inclining against
such an inference if such a claim would traditionally be relegated to state law).
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necessarily retreated from its prior commitments. Thus, although Congress
seemed perturbed by use of the private right to sue when it adopted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995,47 the Court still
thought the message of Borak was crucial when it interpreted the strict
pleading requirements of PSLRA in 2007. Justice Ginsburg began the
Court’s 2007 opinion in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. by observing that “[t]his Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions
to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to
criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively,
by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission.”48 One might regard PSLRA as something of a rebuke to the Court
for creating the problem and think it a bit cheeky for the Court to treat its
preferences as the starting point in interpreting what Congress imposed on
its creation.
If Tellabs suggests that the private enforcement attitude remains alive
and well in the Court, the 2013 decision in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant49 veers the other way. That case involved a suit under the
Clayton Antitrust Act, which explicitly authorizes private suits and sweetens
the pot in such actions by offering treble damages.50 Yet the Court enforced
a class action waiver provision despite seemingly undisputed evidence that
developing the expert analysis necessary to support the antitrust claim
would cost more than $1 million while the individual plaintiff ’s claim was
(even after trebling) $40,000, so a class action would be the only economically feasible method of suing.51 The 5–4 majority noted that class actions
did not exist as an enforcement tool when the Clayton Act was passed more
than a century before—and in any event was not concerned about nullifying
private enforcement:
[T]he antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the
vindication of every claim. Congress has taken some measures to facilitate
the litigation of antitrust claims—for example, it enacted a multiplieddamages remedy. In enacting such measures, Congress has told us that it is

47 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). Among other things, this legislation
imposed strict pleading standards and a discovery stay pending ruling on a motion to dismiss in
securities fraud litigation.
48 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
49 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
50 Id. at 2309; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
51 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308, 2310.
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willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing
its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade practice.52

The dissenters, speaking through Justice Kagan, emphasized that private
enforcement of the antitrust laws is designed “not solely to compensate
individuals but to promote ‘the public interest in vigilant enforcement of
the antitrust laws.’”53 The majority’s attitude toward the crippling effect its
ruling could have on effective enforcement, she said, was “admirably
flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.”54
At least in the federal courts, then, the growth era for private attorney
general activity may be over.
C. Tort Litigation
Tort litigation has always been with us. But since World War II it has
changed, in significant measure due to academic influence and law and
economics analysis that stresses “internalizing” costs. The thrust of modern
products liability law is that tort litigation would prompt manufacturers to
make their products safer. Certainly that is what plaintiffs’ lawyers claim
they have done.55 If their claims to have changed would-be defendants’
behaviors are not persuasive, consider the frequent objection that various
activities have been stopped because of fear of suits.56 At least at the level of
claimed effects, then, there is a surprising agreement between the plaintiffside and defendant-side on bottom-line results; the disagreement is about
whether this effect is desirable.
At the same time, the tort model has grown beyond traditional automobile
tort and similar personal injury claims. A proliferation of new tort-like
claims provides both compensation and deterrence. Suits for workplace
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, bad faith refusals to
settle by insurance companies, and the like bespeak the growing importance
of tort claims. Whether these should be considered “public interest” claims

52
53

Id. at 2309 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S.
322, 329 (1955)).
54 Id.
55 For an illustration, see AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, D RIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION S PURRED AUTO SAFETY I NNOVATIONS (2010), available at http://www.justice.org/cps/
rde/xbcr/justice/Driven_to_Safety.pdf (reporting the views of a leading plaintiffs’ attorneys
group).
56 These claims are so common that citations are hardly necessary.
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akin to those sketched in the previous sections can be debated.57 Whether
one classes consumer deception claims in this same category could also be
debated,58 but some private claims authorized by statute seem to blend into
tort claims. Consider, for example, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,59 in
which plaintiffs asserted a collection of cutting-edge tort theories against
the tobacco industry. The court held that these newly minted claims could
not provide the basis for a massive class action,60 but the effort illustrates
the range of tort litigation innovation that might serve to achieve “public
law” results.61
D. The New World of Corporate Litigation
“Next to war, commercial litigation is the largest item of preventable loss in
civilization.”
–Herbert Hoover62

President Hoover63 was echoing a recurrent theme of pre–World War II
corporate America—business corporations did not sue business corporations.
One consequence of this pervasive attitude was that litigation departments
were poor step children in major law firms. The “real” lawyers were the
corporate lawyers; the litigators were invited in only when necessary to
defend against outsiders such as shareholders, people claiming injury due to
the company’s products, or the government.
Two decades ago Dean Garth described the remarkable change in corporate attitudes toward litigation. By the 1980s, corporate clients began to
shop for lawyers, producing competition among law firms to land corporate

57 See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 647, 671-75 (1988) (exploring the question of whether tort litigation could be seen as
public law litigation).
58 See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that claims under the New York Consumer Protection Act alleging that defendant falsely
claimed that its food products were part of a healthy diet were not claims of “fraud” within FED.
R. CIV. P. 9(b)).
59 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
60 Id. at 752.
61 In somewhat the same vein, consider Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 5 (Scalia,
Circuit Justice 2010), in which Justice Scalia granted a stay against enforcement of a Louisiana
state court class action judgment against the tobacco companies.
62 INST. OF LAW: THE JOHNS H OPKINS UNIV., S URVEY OF CIVIL JUSTICE IN NEW
YORK 1 (1931).
63 Hoover was Secretary of Commerce at the time he made this statement.
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litigation business. Meanwhile:
[T]he business world’s increased competitiveness made businesses eager to
take advantage of whatever was available for economic warfare, including
the law . . . .
Business litigation increased, and there was competition within business
litigation. The principal forms of innovation in litigation, it appears, were
methods that escalated legal conflicts. Every aspect of lawsuits became
contested.64

Some attributed this development to the declining ability of lawyers to
dissuade their clients from pursuing litigation—or at least to dissuade them
from pursuing it in a scorched earth manner.65
Five years later Dean Garth elaborated on the relationship between this
development and the escalating discovery problems reported in some cases:
[L]awyers in the ordinary cases have learned how to manage time and
expense. They have had to do so, since their clients will not pay for
scorched earth tactics. On the other hand, the high-stakes, high-conflict
cases involve clients who pay for the services of lawyers as warriors, and
that is what they usually get. In terms of the legal services market and the
civil discovery problem, it appears that clients seek the elite of the bar only
when they believe that the nature of the problem and the stakes are sufficiently high to justify a major investment in legal services (or, in the contingent fee area, are sufficient for the lawyer to invest substantially in the
case). It is likely that only a fraction of lawyers can claim the fees or attract
the cases that justify (in terms of the stakes) investment in litigation as fullscale warfare . . . .66

The current marketing vogue for “bet the company” lawyers confirms
that these forces are still at work. Sometimes the litigations involved fit into
the prior categories, involving mass tort or toxic tort claims (particularly
multidistrict litigation), private enforcement of public norms (as in securities

64 Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession
and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 942 (1993).
65 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49
MD. L. REV. 869, 899-903 (1990); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 290 (1993) (lamenting the declining ability of
lawyers to influence or guide their clients in making business decisions, as opposed to facilitating
decisions the clients made without lawyer guidance).
66 Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets
in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1998).
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fraud litigation), or twenty-first century ideological litigation like the
Ecuador cleanup suit involving Chevron Corporation.67
Increasingly, however, they represent a new model of business-tobusiness litigation, a situation that sometimes prompts considerable critical
attention. A prime recent example is the concern with “patent troll” litigation, exhibiting characteristics typical of the more general criticism of
litigation. In June 2013, the White House reacted to this development with
a report entitled Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, 68 concerning the
potential impact of suits by “patent assertion entities,” or nonpracticing
holders of patents, which increased 250% in two years and now account for
nearly two-thirds of all patent infringement suits.69
Other developments suggest the magnitude of this trend. In January
2012, The Wall Street Journal reported that prominent Kirkland & Ellis and
Weil, Gotshal & Manges partners left their lucrative niches defending
patent infringement suits and founded new firms to acquire patents and file
patent infringement suits.70 The former Kirkland & Ellis partner said he
was making “much more” at his new firm than he had at Kirkland. His move
showed that, “by crossing over to plaintiffs work, a seasoned defense lawyer
could get some skin in the game and nab a fortune unattainable in Big
Law.”71 The former Weil partner reportedly left behind a $5 million per year
draw to found his new venture.72
Whether one should worry about this development is unclear and beyond the scope of this Essay. In June 2013, the Federal Trade Commission
announced that it was planning an inquiry into frivolous patent lawsuits.73
In July 2013, The New York Times ran a profile of the owner of a prominent
patent infringement plaintiffs’ firm that had supposedly sued 1638 companies
over the past five years.74 Although the story details some bare-knuckle
tactics by its subject, Erich Spangenberg,75 it also offers an example of
67 For those who have not heard of this litigation, a primer on its issues appears in the Stanford
Journal of Complex Litigation, Symposium, Lessons from Chevron, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG., 195523 (2013).
68 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT A SSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
69 Id. at 5.
70 Ashby Jones, When Lawyers Become ‘Trolls,’ WALL S T. J., Jan. 23, 2012, at B1.
71 Julia Love, For Piece of the Action, Powers Need Patents, RECORDER, Aug. 26, 2013, at 11.
72 Jones, supra note 70; see also Love, supra note 71 (reporting that the Weil partner may not
be encountering quite as much success as the Kirkland & Ellis lawyer, who made his move earlier).
73 Cf. Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Is Said to Plan Inquiry of Frivolous Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2013, at B1.
74 David Segal, Has Patent. Will Sue., N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013 (Sunday Business), at 1.
75 Id. (quoting Spangenberg as saying, “[o]nce you go thug, though, you can’t unthug”).
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Spangenberg coming to the defense of a victim of a patent troll. The White
House report recommended three methods for resolving the problem it
identified, including “reduc[ing] disparity of litigation costs.”76 That may
remind us of another observation by Dean Garth about scorched earth
business litigation more generally:
Lawyers c[an] make life very difficult for any opposing business by taking
advantage of the open-ended nature of discovery under Federal Rule 26,
proliferating depositions and requests for documents or fighting aggressively
to resist such requests. Discovery practice in the 1970s became the key to
the practice of corporate litigation.77

III. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DISCOVERY
Discovery was central to the original Federal Rules’ reform package. We
are told repeatedly that it is also central to effective litigation reform78;
hence the longstanding place discovery has had on the Advisory Committee’s
agenda. One looking at the present and to the future must recognize that
discovery has surely achieved many of the goals that the framers hoped it
would achieve. Thus, in the 1960s, when scholars intensely studied the
question of whether to relax the tethers on the discovery rules, the empirical
research commissioned by the Advisory Committee showed that discovery
did much good, but hardly solved all problems. Already conflict over scope
had become a principal source of controversy.79 But other aspects of the
1960s research may surprise contemporary observers. The chief objections
then were to interrogatories, not document requests:80 “Interrogatories are
the only device that causes the average recipient to work at least as hard as
the sender. . . . [R]ecipients suspect that senders are shifting the burden
to them, instead of doing the work of document inspection themselves.”81

76
77
78

EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 68, at 13.
Garth, supra note 64, at 942.
I base this statement on my seventeen years of service as Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, focusing throughout that time on discovery rules. I am characterizing what I have heard in that capacity and found in the Committee’s files. For developments
before I took this position in 1996, see Richard Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 747 (1998) (detailing discovery reforms between 1976 and 1996).
79 See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE A DVERSARY SYSTEM 161
(1968) (“Disputes over scope may be inherent in the adversary system, since each side tries to
define the subject matter in its own self-interested way.”).
80 Id. at 149.
81 Id. at 151-52.
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But at that time depositions were “the central device in discovery,”82 and
it appeared that defendants used discovery more frequently than did
plaintiffs and gained more from it.83 The pro- and anti-discovery views were
already well established, however. As the empirical study on which the
rulemakers relied for their 1960s reforms described the situation then: “[t]he
critics ‘know’ that discovery is abused generally and should be abolished.
The admirers ‘know’ that discovery is unblemished by misuse. But facts
sometimes confound all faiths.”84 As in the 1960s, more recent research
generally confirms that discovery costs are relatively reasonable in much
federal court litigation.85
That 1960s insight led to the revision of the discovery rules effective in
1970, the high water point for discovery liberality. Since then, the main
impulse has been to contain and constrain discovery.86 In terms of the
various kinds of litigation identified in Part II that the framers probably
could not foresee, these changes address issues primarily related to three of
the kinds of litigation—private attorney general suits, tort litigation, and
corporate litigation. The first category—“impact” or “structural” litigation—
has generated far more ire about “imperial” federal judges than about
discovery burdens. Indeed, it is not clear that most of the early impact
litigation even depended much on discovery. Brown v. Board of Education
introduced the notion of “legislative fact,”87 something that the Court could
find through library research, not something depending on discovery in the
case.
More recently, the line between “impact” litigation (the first category)
and private attorney litigation designed to enforce public norms more
generally (the second category) has blurred. At least some cases seem to fit

82
83
84
85

Id. at 52.
Id. at 51, 83, 90.
Id. at 117.
See Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1102-16 (2012) (examining 1997 and 2009 Federal Judicial
Center closed case studies).
86 For a review of these developments through 1993, see generally Marcus, supra note 78. The
2000 discovery amendments largely continued this trend, as did the proposals in the 2013
Preliminary Draft, infra note 93.
87 In 1942, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis introduced the idea of “legislative facts” to describe
courts’ actions in engaging in semi-factual research that goes beyond the formal evidence
contained in court records. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 407 (1942). That sort of activity became central to
cases like Brown v. Board of Education. See Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966).
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into both categories. For example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes88 was both
a private employment discrimination case and an effort to have a very broad
impact, perhaps to shift employment discrimination law. But the failure of
the class certification effort in the Wal-Mart case was surely not a result of
lack of discovery.89 To the contrary, the emerging abandonment of the idea
that courts cannot evaluate merits issues in connection with class certification
seems likely to open a door for plaintiff discovery in class actions that had,
until recently, been shut. 90 So for the twenty-first century version of
“impact” litigation, considerable discovery may be necessary early in the
case.91
Because the classic version of “impact” litigation has faded in importance,
it is the other three types of litigation identified in Part II that probably
constitute a major portion of the “problem” cases that prompt objections to
broad discovery. As many have noted, careful research by the Federal
Judicial Center Research Division in the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries has shown that discovery does not seem to be a significant
problem in “normal” litigation, probably of the sort the framers would have
anticipated. Of course, the 1951 Prettyman Report’s focus on the burdens of
massive evidentiary showings92 demonstrates that the calm did not long
endure or at least that disruptive new forces soon intruded—although the
stress in 1951 was not on discovery burdens borne by responding parties.
Much of the response to concerns about overdiscovery has depended on
numerical cutting back and judicial management. Both techniques continue
to be important.93 But neither really qualifies as a breakthrough idea that
88
89

131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
Id. at 2561. No claim was made that plaintiffs were denied needed discovery. It seems they
must have had quite a lot; their statistical expert “conducted his analysis region-by-region,
comparing the number of women promoted into management positions with the percentage of
women in the available pool of hourly workers.” Id. at 2555. That information must have come
from discovery.
90 See generally Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the
Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (2011) (tracing the increasing willingness of lower courts to probe “merits” issues when deciding whether to certify a class).
91 An example may be useful. In Beach v. Healthways, Inc., defendants had already produced
1.7 million pages of documents and anticipated a total production of 6.8 million pages during precertification discovery. 264 F.R.D. 360, 362 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). Pointing to this effort,
defendants argued that, “if a class is ultimately not certified or if the class period were shortened,
the defendants will have spent millions of dollars for naught.” Id. at 362. One doubts that the
defendants would regard this effort as going “for naught” if it led to denial of class certification,
though they would surely prefer to reach that result by a less costly route.
92 See Prettyman Report, supra note 16.
93 Thus, the package of proposed amendments published for public comment in August 2013
included revisions of numerical limitations for interrogatories and depositions and introduction of
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the framers might find distinctive. Judicial management surely was known
to them: Rule 34 did not originally permit document requests without
advance judicial approval, and Rule 35 examinations of a party still require
judicial approval unless the parties stipulate.94 So it cannot be said that
these recent adjustments move in a qualitatively distinctive direction. Of
the variety of measures that have been introduced since 1970, I think that
attention can most profitably focus on two—initial disclosure and proportionality.
A. Initial Disclosure
Before the 1970s, clamor about overly burdensome discovery was not
particularly prominent, and concerns about secrecy seemed more pressing.
Certainly American lawyers’ penchant for adversarial maneuver and surprise
at trial irked Roscoe Pound, who denounced it during his famous 1906
speech.95 An abiding question is whether that penchant can be changed, and
whether it should be changed. Curiously, in the very case in which it
declared that the cherished cry of “fishing expedition”—used by those
seeking to defeat discovery—could no longer hold sway, the Supreme Court
simultaneously enshrined the work product doctrine as a basis for resisting
discovery.96 At least some lawyerly secrets could be kept under wraps.
From one perspective, this gamesmanship lies at the heart of most of the
contemporary cavil about discovery. Repeatedly, the defense-side argument
stresses the overbreadth of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, particularly Rule
34 requests. The argument, understandably, is that it is expensive to have to
find and turn over reams of material, and particularly galling when most of
that material never reappears in the case (either as exhibits in depositions or

numerical limits for requests for admissions. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 284-86
(2013) [hereinafter COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT] (proposing amending Rule 16 to
reduce the time before a scheduling order is entered and adding preservation and orders under
FED. R. EVID. 502 to the agenda for contents of a scheduling order); id. at 300 (proposing
amending Rule 30 to reduce the number of depositions without leave of court from ten to five); id.
at 305 (proposing amending Rule 33 to reduce the number of interrogatories from twenty-five to
fifteen); id. at 310 (proposing amending Rule 36 to limit requests for admissions to twenty-five).
Note that after the public comment period, some of these proposals were revised or withdrawn.
94 See FED. R. CIV . P. 35.
95 Pound attacked “our American exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure,”
including partisan witnesses and slashing but spurious cross-examination. See Pound, supra note 10,
at 404-05. He also denounced “deciding cases on points of practice.” Id. at 408.
96 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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at trial or in connection with summary judgment motions). Understandably,
one argument is that discovery should focus mainly on the much smaller
number of items that will be used in that way in the case, even if it is not
limited solely to those things.97
It seems undeniable that much discovery yields more than the party
seeking production really wants. To take a fifty-year old case as an illustration:
in the MER/29 litigation in the early 1960s, plaintiffs’ lawyers in the
consolidated discovery obtained sixty-five rolls of microfilm with more than
100,000 documents for shared review. 98 Under counsel’s coordination
agreements, this material was reviewed by a “trustee” who “spent virtually
two summers reading and copying pertinent documents on the film, even
then reading only half.”99 A decade later, in the Bendectin litigation, things
seemed not to have changed a great deal because of the differences in
resources between plaintiffs’ counsel and defendant Merrell:
This difference in resources is graphically illustrated by the way in which
one of the [individual plaintiff ’s] lawyers dealt with production of the
lengthy new drug applications produced by Merrell: he rented a microfilm
machine in Florida, loaded it in his car, drove to New York where Merrell’s
lawyers had their office, and microfilmed the documents himself. . . . [T]ry as they did, plaintiffs’ lawyers in the individual suit “did
not have the resources or capacity that Merrell did.” The formation of the
plaintiffs’ litigation committee in connection with the multidistrict litigation “afforded plaintiffs’ lawyers a far more level playing field in terms of
97 In that vein, consider the recent revision of the scope of discovery under MINN. R. CIV.
P. 26.02(b), effective July 1, 2013 (new matter italicized; deleted matter overstricken):

Discovery must be limited to matters that would enable a party to prove or disprove a claim
or defense or to impeach a witness and must comport with the factors of proportionality, including without limitation, the burden or expense of the proposed discovery weighed against its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery
in resolving the issues. Subject to these limitations, Pparties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to a claim or defense of any party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. Upon a showing of For good cause and
proportionality, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information sought need not be admissible at
the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
98 Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 116, 127-29 (1968).
99 Id. at 130.
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stakes and available resources,” and plaintiffs’ discovery in the multidistrict
action was accordingly much broader than in the individual suit.100

Although these rudimentary techniques and the relatively small volume
may seem quaint, it is likely that the experience is repeated today—those
who receive massive amounts of discovery may be overwhelmed by it. Even
though the plaintiffs’ bar today seems much better organized and financed
than it was in the 1960s through the 1980s, it surely can still be overwhelmed
by production under Rule 34. Why, one might ask, don’t these lawyers limit
their requests to what they really need and want? One answer sometimes
suggested by the defense side is that the breadth of plaintiff requests is
designed to defeat resolution of cases on their merits. In the new world of
plaintiff networks created by the American Association for Justice and other
organizations, the contention runs, the plaintiffs’ lawyers already have the
documents they really need. What they are doing, we have been told, is
trying to lay the groundwork for a sanctions motion when overwhelmed
defendants fail to produce some of the documents that plaintiffs’ counsel
already have, enabling them to seek a default judgment or other advantage
for failure to produce.101 Thus overbroad discovery requests might be used
to club the defendant into submission in two ways—by the sheer cost of
compliance, and due to the additional fear that even a huge effort to comply
will not prevent a sanction foreclosing defense on the merits.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers do not always respond to these arguments by claiming
that they make narrow discovery requests. They do argue persuasively that
because few of them are being paid by the hour, they have no incentive to
generate more work for their side. They might say that the fact they do not
even review everything they get is simply a sign that they are engaged in
sensible triage. And even though some of them acknowledge that the
plaintiffs’ bar is much better organized and financed than it was in the 1960s
and 1970s, they emphasize that defense counsel nevertheless routinely
outguns them.
The basic problem, plaintiffs’ lawyers say, is that narrow requests will
not produce the needed information; they must request lots of chaff to make
certain they get the wheat. For one thing, they cannot request that defendant
produce “the 100 documents that best show that defendant should be found

100 Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231, 24344 (1997) (citations omitted) (reviewing and quoting M ICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND
BIRTH DEFECTS : THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996)).
101 I distinctly remember defense-side lawyers making this argument during the Advisory
Committee’s September 1997 conference on discovery.
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liable.” That simply is not a request that would satisfy Rule 34’s particularity
requirement.102 Moreover, it seems to intrude precisely into opinion work
product, the most sacrosanct precinct.103 How could one side require the
other side’s lawyer to reveal judgments about which documents would be
most damning? Certainly that is a topic on defense counsel’s mind during
trial preparation, but it is also precisely the sort of insight that the protection of opinion work product is designed to keep secret. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
would not be receptive to reciprocal discovery requests that may reveal the
holes in their cases.
So from the plaintiffs’ point of view, what is necessary is to cast a wide
net and try as best as possible to identify in the mass of discovered information the things that one cannot ask defense counsel to cull for the
plaintiffs—the triage referred to above. Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel
emphatically argue that too many defense counsel engage in games of their
own, holding back “hot” documents on spurious grounds,104 sending up a
smoke screen of distracting objections, or over-producing to magnify the
chore for plaintiffs’ counsel who are trying to find the relatively few really
important documents in the mass of marginally relevant or totally irrelevant
documents. This is not a good state of affairs, the plaintiffs’ side says, but it
is better than not getting what you need at all. As Judge Facciola has noted,
“like the Rolling Stones, [plaintiffs’ counsel] hope that if they ask for what
they want, they will get what they need. They hardly need any more encouragement to demand as much as they can from their opponent.”105
In short, we seem to have reached an impasse. The plaintiff-side arguments that defense counsel engage in their own discovery games seems
sufficient to warrant a response of some sort.106 At the same time, it is hard

102 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (mandating that a request “describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected”).
103 See FED. R. CIV . P. 26(b)(3)(B) (directing the court to “protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney” even where it
finds that production of work product is warranted).
104 Such spurious grounds might include exploiting the other side’s use of narrowly tailored
requests to support the argument that the bombshell document was not requested.
105 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2001).
106 On this score, note that the pending package of amendment proposals includes proposed
amendments to address such behavior. See COMM. ON RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note
93, at 307-08 (amending Rule 34 to require that responding parties “state the grounds for objecting
to the request with specificity” and also “state whether any responsive materials are being withheld
on the basis of that objection”).
At least some judges appear receptive to ending such avoidance games. Consider Silicon
Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.C. 2012), where the judge exhibited
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to believe that either side is entirely innocent of the sort of behavior
charged by the other side. Has it never happened that a plaintiff ’s lawyer
designed a discovery demand partly to impose burdens on defendant, or
that a defense lawyer adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of a discovery
request to excuse turning over damaging information? But one might hope
for a method better tailored to avoid the game-playing by both plaintiff and
defense lawyers.
In the early 1990s, the Advisory Committee tried to find such a method,
and it hit upon initial disclosure. To some extent, this general idea may have
mirrored the United Kingdom’s system of “disclosure,” which relies on
counsel to be relatively forthcoming. Indeed, in the wake of the Lord Woolf
reforms to U.K. procedure in the late 1990s, there are now “pre-action
protocols” that “encourage the exchange of early and full information about
the prospective legal claim.”107 Congress itself had chimed in with the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, which encouraged individual districts to adopt
“principles” including “encouragement of cost-effective discovery through
voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their attorneys and
through the use of cooperative discovery devices.”108 Judge Schwarzer, a
leader in litigation reform, had urged similar principles in a 1989 paper.109
Thinking along the same lines, the Advisory Committee published a
1991 proposed amendment adding a requirement of initial disclosure,
without the need for a formal discovery request, regarding any person likely

little tolerance for plaintiff ’s avoidance gaming, reacting:
In addition to boilerplate objections, Silicon Knights also added specious responses to some discovery requests. For example, in response to Epic Games’s
eighth and ninth requests for production, Silicon Knights stated that, “[s]ubject to
and without waiving any of [its] objections . . . , [Silicon Knights] will endeavor to
identify and produce appropriately responsive documents.”. . . This vague, openended response merely “state[s] an intention to make some production at an unspecified date of [Silicon Knights’s] own choosing [and] is not a complete answer as
required by Rule 34(b) and, therefore, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(3) is treated as a failure to answer or respond.”
Id. at 533-34 (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec Inc., 268 F.R.D.
226, 247 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (citations omitted)).
107 See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7-8 (2003) (describing the new approach, and noting that the pre-action
protocols operate in the shadow of “the Damoclean sword of costs and other sanctions”) (internal
citations omitted).
108 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (2006).
109 See William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721-23 (1989) (proposing adoption of a rule requiring disclosure of all
relevant information without the need for a formal discovery request).
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to have “information that bears significantly on any claim or defense” and a
description of any documents “likely to bear significantly on any claim or
defense.”110 That proposal may seem innocuous—at least when compared
with the supposedly immense burdens of contemporary discovery—but it
was received with great alarm by both sides of the bar.111 The Advisory
Committee retreated and decided to limit the disclosure requirement to
information and documents “relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,” seemingly encouraging more informative pleading.112
Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas denounced that more limited proposal
because it did “not replace the current, much-criticized discovery process;
rather, it add[ed] a further layer of discovery.”113 Worse yet, they thought, it
threatened to undermine the entire fabric of American litigation ethics:
By placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to
their clients—on their own initiative, and in a context where the lines between what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed are not clear
but require the exercise of considerable judgment—the new Rule would
place intolerable strain upon lawyers’ ethical duty to represent their clients
and not to assist the opposing side.114

Notwithstanding these concerns, the amendment went into effect—but
only because one senator refused to waive the Senate’s rules and the bill
striking initial disclosure from the package therefore failed to pass.115 And
the amended rule permitted district courts to secede from initial disclosure
by local rule, which many did, producing a patchwork practice across the
federal judicial system that the Federal Judicial Center attempted to monitor
on an annual basis.116 To restore national uniformity, the initial disclosure
rule was revised in 2000 to make it apply nationwide but only to witnesses
or documents that the disclosing party may use to support its case; each side
110 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-88 (1991).
111 See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 808-09 (1993) (describing tumult).
112 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431-32 (1993).
113 Id. at 510.
114 Id. at 511.
115 See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Aponovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
461, 485 (1997) (describing how one senator’s refusal to consent to suspending the rules prevented
legislation that would have removed initial disclosure from the 1993 rule amendment package).
116 See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE
IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC A TTENTION TO COURTS’
RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (1998)
(describing and categorizing local regimes of initial disclosure).

1716

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1691

would still need conventional discovery to obtain material helpful to its
case.117
This is not a happy history. True, the broadest of disclosure regimes may
ask lawyers to do something that genuinely conflicts with their ingrained
instincts.118 But unless something like this can break the impasse, it may be
that moderate refinements seem safer than dramatic changes. On the
moderate refinement front, the recent development of disclosure protocols
for individual employment discrimination litigation119 may pave the way
toward workable solutions, but more work will need to be done before those
solutions exist in most cases.
B. Proportionality
In 1961, when it published its massive Developments in the Law—
Discovery, the Harvard Law Review noted at the outset that “[e]ven when
invoked sparingly, discovery may impose upon both parties and nonparties
burdens of cost and inconvenience that are disproportionate to the signifi-

117
118

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
Consider the following “letter” to a client that an Arizona lawyer offered as a parody of
what state court disclosure rules there would require:
[W]e should schedule a meeting at the earliest possible opportunity, at which time
you should be prepared to provide an outline, which I will immediately provide to
plaintiff’s attorney, of all facts which tend to support the claims for relief the plaintiff
has set forth in the complaint.
[I]f the plaintiff has failed to pursue any appropriate claims against your company, we should also gather and pass on to plaintiff ’s counsel all facts which he would
want to know that he might amend his claim to pursue any additional theories of relief against your company.
Robert J. Bruno, The Disclosure Rule Is a Mistake, MARICOPA LAW., Aug. 1992, at 6. A plaintiff ’s
lawyer responded that it was “ridiculous” and that “such efforts were so clearly silly that no
reasonable advocate would expect a defense lawyer to engage in them.” JoJene Mills, Practical
Implications of the Zlaket Rules from a Plaintiff ’s Lawyer’s Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 149, 163 (1993).
119 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR E MPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE A CTION 2 (2011). As described in
the introduction:
The Protocols create a new category of information exchange, replacing initial
disclosures with initial discovery specific to employment cases alleging adverse
action. This discovery is provided automatically by both sides within 30 days of the
defendant’s responsive pleading or motion. While the parties’ subsequent right to
discovery under the F.R.C.P. is not affected, the amount and type of information
initially exchanged ought to focus the disputed issues, streamline the discovery process,
and minimize opportunities for gamesmanship.
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cance of the litigation to those who must bear such burdens.”120 Twenty
years later, Professor Arthur Miller, then Reporter of the Advisory Committee,
“perceive[d] the need for imposing some restraint on cumulative and
excessive discovery.”121 This was the prompt for the proportionality provisions installed in the discovery rules in 1983. At the time, Professor Miller
announced that these changes heralded a “180-degree shift” in federal
discovery.122
In all likelihood, Professor Miller was premature in that announcement.
When I prepared the second edition of the Federal Practice & Procedure
volumes addressing discovery a decade later, I added a new section dealing
with proportionality, but had to report that “[t]he [proportionality]
amendment itself seems to have created only a ripple in the case law.”123 But
by the time the third edition appeared in 2010, things had changed, and I
could report that the “attention to the proportionality provisions has grown
since 1994, and endorsement of their use has widened.”124
In part, this expansion of attention to proportionality can be traced to
rule changes. In 2000, a cross-reference to the proportionality provisions
was added to Rule 26(b)(1), the basic rule on scope of discovery.125 The 2013
proposed amendments relocate that proportionality in Rule 26(b)(1),
elevating it more directly into the basic definition of the scope of discovery.126
If this change is adopted, the existing trend to emphasize proportionality
may accelerate.
Perhaps more basically, there is great appeal to the concept of proportionality. But that does not mean that it is easy for judges to apply. For one
thing, the “value” of a case is uncertain, particularly at the outset. Although
we recognize that the monetary amount claimed by the plaintiffs suffices to

120
121

Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942 (1961).
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaning f ul Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 354 (2013).
122 ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE A UGUST 1983 A MENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE M ANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 32-33 (1984).
123 8 CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & RICHARD MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (2d ed. 1994).
124 8 CHARLES WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER & RICHARD MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2010).
125 See FED. R. CIV . P. 26(b)(1) (“All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C).”).
126 See COMM. ON RULES , PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 289-90.
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satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction,127
the relaxed standard seems manifestly insufficient for determining whether
highly burdensome or costly discovery is warranted.
The “value” of proposed discovery also may be debated. Although economists may urge that any discovery foray that does not promise to provide
more “value” in evidence than it would cost the other side to provide be
regarded as “abusive,”128 that determination is often elusive. Until discovery
is done, it is surely difficult to predict with confidence what it will produce,
and results might depend in some cases on whether the responding party
actually complies with its discovery obligations. The question whether
“overbroad” requests are necessary to procure the essential information
remains salient. Moreover, measuring the prospective benefit against the
cost requires some confidence about what those costs will be; it may be that
the responding party has a strong incentive to magnify those costs in hopes
of making the entire exercise unnecessary. So many mechanical obstacles lie
in the way of actual proportionality decisions.
Beyond these difficulties, there may be value judgments that complicate
the calculus. The rule acknowledges that one of the things the court should
focus on is “the importance of the issues at stake in the action.”129 Perhaps
in a case like Brown v. Board of Education, that is easy to take into account;
had extensive discovery been needed (as seems not to have been the case),
one would have a strong argument that the sky should be the limit. In other
cases, things may not be so easy, as Professor Sherman pointed out when
proportionality was first added to the rules:
What values should be used in deciding whether, for example, the plaintiff
in a $10,000 personal injury case should be limited in the number of depositions he may take, or the plaintiff seeking reinstatement in an employment
discrimination case should be prohibited from discovering documents only
tangentially related to the claim, or the defendant in a $10,000,000 product
liability case should be allowed to require answers to voluminous interrogatories involving the most searching details of plaintiff ’s past life?130

127 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90 (1938) (holding that,
for purposes of satisfying the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the court
must accept plaintiff ’s claim for more than that amount so long as it is made in “good faith”).
128 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO.
L.J. 61, 61 (1995) (urging such an approach).
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
130 Edward F. Sherman & Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80’s—Making
the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 276 (1982).
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Some may recoil at the notion that a dollar value provides meaningful
guidance about the pursuit of justice. As Judge Learned Hand famously
intoned, “Thou shalt not ration justice.”131 But surely that aspiration must
be limited, at least with regard to wide-ranging discovery, by the possibility
that litigation expense may itself frustrate or prevent justice. Even litigators
should concede that it would not be sensible for all of society’s assets to be
consumed by the transaction costs of litigation.
A tricky but central problem is to determine when discovery that seems
“reasonable” in terms of providing needed evidence is nonetheless too costly
or burdensome given the small stakes involved. As noted above, it must be
true that plaintiffs’ lawyers make such calculations every time they decide
whether to take on a contingent-fee case, asking whether the prospective
recovery justifies the cost and effort of pursuing it in court. Part of that
expense will be the cost of discovery; in 1997, the Federal Judicial Center’s
research study suggested that discovery actually often costs plaintiffs more
than defendants.132 For decades, however, litigants seeking discovery have
invoked Rule 26(b)(1)’s seeming invitation to do any discovery “reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and argued that
what they wanted was so calculated.133 Actually, that phrase was not included
in the rule to support this sort of argument, and the current amendment
package proposes removing it to eliminate this confusion.134
The question may remain, however: should proportionality concerns
prevent discovery that is “reasonable” in terms of producing admissible
evidence? The English experience provides an analogy that may be instructive. In the U.K., of course, the full indemnity principle has prevailed for

131 Judge Hand made this statement in his seventy-fifth anniversary address to the Legal Aid
Society of New York on February 16, 1951. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise
by Viewing Excessive Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 421
(2012) (quoting Judge Hand).
132 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under
the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 tbl.3 (1998) (showing that at the 95th
percentile, the discovery cost for plaintiffs was one-third higher than for defendants). A recent
illustration comes from Timothy McDonald, Alternative Approaches in Responding to Medical Errors,
TRIAL, May 2013, at 34, an article for plaintiffs’ lawyers who sue for medical malpractice. Written,
it seems, from the perspective of a hospital, the article endorses a more forthcoming approach
from hospitals. In service to that goal, it also appears to use discovery costs as a reason for
plaintiffs’ lawyers to tread softly: “Once the patient obtains counsel, defense attorneys will deny
and defend any and all allegations against their client. This often results in a protracted discovery
process over many years where the defense employs legal maneuvers to keep information away
from the patient, family, and their counsel.” Id. at 36.
133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
134 See COMM. ON RULES , PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 289-90.
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centuries—the winning litigant gets to recover its costs of suit, including
attorneys’ fees, from the loser. Although that indemnity principle was
hedged a bit by the idea that only “reasonable” expenditures on litigation
could be charged to the other side, indemnity still ruled the day in most
instances. But Lord Woolf’s revisions to U.K. practice installed proportionality
as a central concern in the late 1990s.135
The question shortly arose whether disproportionate expenditures on
litigation could be recovered from the other side if they were reasonably
calculated to assist in winning the case. Speaking for the court, Lord Woolf
himself explained in 2002 that the standard should be “necessity,” adding
that “the threshold required to meet necessity is higher than that of reasonableness.”136
Despite the centrality of proportionality to Lord Woolf ’s reforms, the
problem of excessive costs did not go away, and in 2009, Lord Justice
Jackson was assigned the task of studying ways to improve the handling of
costs. Declaring that the effect of Lord Woolf ’s test “was to insert the
Victorian test of necessity into the modern concept of proportionality,”
Lord Justice Jackson rejected Lord Woolf’s 2002 conclusion and recommended
that the U.K. make a change:
Disproportionate costs do not become proportionate because they were
necessary. If the level of costs incurred is out of proportion to the circumstances of the case, they cannot become proportionate simply because they
were “necessary” in order to bring or defend the claim. It will be recalled . . . that the Legal Services Commission applies a cost/benefit test
when deciding whether to support a case with public funds. Any self funding
litigant would do the same. The fact that it was necessary to incur certain
costs in order to prove or disprove a head of claim is obviously relevant, but
it is not decisive of the question whether such costs were proportionate.137

135 See ADRIAN AS Z UCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-3 (2003) (describing the new
code’s emphasis on proportionality as a “radical departure from past practice”).
136 Home Office v. Lownds, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 365, [37] 1 W.L.R. 2450.
137 RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS : F INAL REPORT 37
(2009). Since the Jackson Report, the rules have been revised to include the following in Civil
Procedure Rule 44.3(2):

Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will—
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are
disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and (b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and
proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.
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It may be that American judges will increasingly be called upon to make
such judgments in deciding what discovery should be ordered.138 A recent
paper by Judge Wistrich and Professor Rachlinski suggests that such efforts
may be necessary due to what they call “nonconsequentialist reasoning”—
“the heuristic that more information must be better, without regard for the
cost of that information or the need for it”:
Litigators thus suffer from a double distortion: they overvalue the additional
information and undervalue the costs incurred by the responding party in
providing the information. Lawyers also likely do not realize that the additional information might hinder or distort their own judgment.139

Perhaps a reorientation could rekindle interest in more vigorous initial
disclosure requirements. For their part, Judge Wistrich and Professor
Rachlinski endorse that reform and favor tightening numerical limits on
discovery and enhanced judicial management.140 The latter two were, of
course, significant features of the 2013 package of proposed amendments.141
IV. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE
The twentieth century concerns examined above are still with us, and we
have added some twenty-first century concerns to their ranks. For one thing,
debate about discovery does not seem likely to become more restrained.
Already this year, the existing discovery rules have been attacked as “un-

Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, 2013, S.I. 2013/262 (Eng. & Wales). For discussion of
this effort, see John Sorabji, Prospects for Proportionality: Jackson Implementation, 32 CIV. JUST. Q.
213 (2013).
The issues raised in U.K. litigation are not the same as in American discovery, where the
court has since 1983 been directed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) to limit disproportionate
discovery in advance. Thus, Professor Andrews has objected to the new U.K. regime on the
ground that “proportionality is a criterion imposed after-the-event (as distinct from costs
management exercised during the earlier stages of litigation in a particular case, or other ex ante
constraints such as case management restrictions on the scope of the litigation and its intensity, or
costs capping). Neil Andrews, On ‘Proportionate’ Costs 11 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal
Stud., Research Paper No. 22/2014, 2014) (citation omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399061.
138 A possible analogy is to the handling of requests for “disproportionate” attorneys’ fee
awards in cases governed by a fee-shifting statute. For decades, “billing judgment” was to guide
these decisions, but the basic problem continues.
139 Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86
S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 604-06 (2013).
140 Id. at 623-27.
141 See COMM. ON RULES , PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 267-68. It should be
noted, however, that the numerical limit changes were removed after the public comment period.
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American”142 and a proposed amendment designed to constrain discovery
has faced the same criticism. 143 Meanwhile, some seem still to regard
discovery and litigation as a way to shine a “spotlight” on practices they
dislike,144 and the idea that there may be an important First Amendment
right to obtain information through discovery and disseminate it may be
returning.145 Perhaps taking such ideas to heart, a pro se litigant recently
filed a suit in which one of his “counts” was for discovery. The district court
dismissed, explaining that “discovery is not a claim one can make in a
complaint; it is a process litigants undertake after they have filed their
initial pleadings and dispositive motions.” 146 Perhaps some things never
change.
Some developments, however, did occur. For example, defendants sometimes recognize that they too like American discovery. A striking example
arose out of the venomous litigation against Chevron Corporation regarding
pollution in Ecuador. Employing a statute enabling litigants to obtain
discovery here for use in litigation outside this country,147 Chevron embarked
on what the Third Circuit called a discovery effort “unique in the annals of
American judicial history.”148 In a February 2013 law school conference about
this litigation, a lawyer who has represented Chevron issued a warning to
plaintiffs inclined to file such suits: “Even if you are a defendant litigating
142 See Comments of Lawyers for Civil Justice, to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and
the Discovery Subcommittee (Apr. 1, 2013) (stating that the American requirement that the
responding party usually pays for the cost of responding to discovery is “the Un-American Rule”);
see also Jessica D. Miller et al., Can E-Discovery Violate Due Process (Part 2), L. TECH. NEWS, June
10, 2013, at 1 (arguing that “forcing a defendant to pay significant discovery expenses (without any
contribution from the plaintiff ) absent any finding of liability arguably infringes the defendant’s
right to due process”).
143 Letter from John R. Cady & Christopher Aulepp, Cady Law Firm, LLC, to Jonathan
Rose, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Aug. 14, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0263 (asserting that “[t]he proposed change to
Rule 26(b) is un-American”).
144 See, e.g., BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE
LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT—AND WON 42 (2005) (referring to a national human
rights litigator who “used litigation like a spotlight, dragging government officials and what he
considered to be their wrongheaded policies into the glare”).
145 See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2348168 (arguing that a recent Supreme Court statement breathes new life into the
public access idea). For counterarguments, see Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality
Controversy, 1991 U. I LL. L. REV. 457; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983).
146 Finley v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 969, 976 (W.D. Tenn. 2012).
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
148 In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 282 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
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in a foreign tribunal, discovery is available in the United States.”149 And a
recent practitioners’ article on how to defend class actions suggested that
discovery is a way for defendants to win such cases.150
These issues continue to attract attention from on high. For example, in
December 2011, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on the “Costs and Burdens of Civil Discovery.”151 Before the next
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Chairman of this
subcommittee wrote to the judges who head the Advisory Committee and
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure expressing
hope that the committees “will recommend enacting rule reforms to address
the principal concerns discussed at the hearing. Such reforms would free
Americans to devote their financial resources to job creation and more
productive, economic uses.”152
Proposed amendments had been under study since the Advisory Committee’s conference at Duke Law School in May 2010, and were published
for public comment in August 2013.153 Much public commentary followed,
showing that there is fervent disagreement on a number of points. It may be
that the framers would have expected nothing less. But in at least two ways,
the present issues probably differ from what they would have anticipated.
A. The Digital Revolution
We are regularly told that there has been a digital “revolution” and that
everything is different as a result. For more than thirty years, computer
technology has changed the way lawyers work. It remains unclear whether
the legal profession will undergo a revolution as a result,154 although there is

149 Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Ten Lessons From the Chevron Litigation: The Defense Perspective, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 219, 234 (2013) (capitalization altered for readability).
150 See Kenneth Sulzer & Laura Reathaford, How to Defend Regional Class Actions, S.F. DAILY
J., Aug. 23, 2013, at 5 (“Discovery is also often a battleground in litigating the size of the class and
many times can be the ‘win’ the employer needs to get the case resolved.”).
151 Costs and Burdens of Civil Discovery: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011).
152 Letter from Rep. Trent Franks, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Judge Mark R. Kravitz, Chairman, U.S. Judicial Conference Comm.
on Rules of Practice & Procedure, and Judge David G. Campbell, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory
Comm. (Mar. 21, 2012).
153 See COMM. ON RULES , PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93.
154 For ruminations on the subject, see Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the
Legal Profession: Evolution or Revolution?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827 (2008).
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a passable argument that digital technology has revolutionized the medical
profession.155
But there is good reason to conclude that digital technology has revolutionized discovery in the last two decades or so. As recently as 2000, I was
buttonholed by prominent litigators who urged that the Federal Rules be
revised to state explicitly that email is discoverable; they told me that their
corporate clients would not take their word for it. Fairly soon, Corporate
America clearly got the word. In 2006, amendments were added to deal
explicitly with discovery of this form of evidence.156 Rather quickly, most of
the states adopted very similar provisions.
Rule changes are not a sufficient measure of the prominence of
e-discovery. A better measure is money. From next to nothing in 2000, an
e-discovery industry has arisen that is expected to be worth $9.9 billion in
2017.157 That figure does not represent attorneys’ fees, but rather the revenues of e-discovery providers. True, this development is part of a larger
information-management evolution,158 but it is a very large part. It is large
enough to get the attention of law firms; many of them now have
e-discovery departments. It is also large enough to get the attention of law
schools; at least sixty of those now (like Hastings) offer courses in
e-discovery. In 2012, the RAND Corporation published a study of the costs of
e-discovery (and of the attorney time involved in reviewing its fruits) and
concluded that only predictive coding offered the promise of significantly
curbing those costs.159 Since then, predictive coding has been the hottest
topic on the e-discovery market; many vendors tout their products as “the
best.”
This new industry meets a need, and that need is mainly fueled by
American discovery, although governmental investigations and other
activities play a part. In the era of television shows like CSI, it may seem to
many jurors that every important activity leaves electronic footprints, so
155 See Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 265-73 (2009)
(contrasting the impact of computers on what doctors do).
156 For discussion, see Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to
E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004).
157 See Sean Doherty, Research Group Claims E-Discovery Market to Reach $9.9B in 2017, L.
TECH. NEWS, Aug. 9, 2013, available at LEXIS. Of that worldwide figure, $7.2 billion was forecast as
the U.S. share. Id.
158 See, e.g., Coping with Asian Languages in E-Discovery, Uncovering Fraud, Intrusions and More,
METROPOLITAN CORP. C OUNS., Sept. 2013, at 22 (describing e-discovery technology that can
also be used to detect hacking and fraud).
159 See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 97-99 (2012).
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that they should be presented with digital evidence (ideally video footage)
to prove what happened. Certainly the remarkable use of video footage to
identify the bombers in the Boston Marathon bombing attack illustrated
how important this material can be to resolving disputes that end up in
court. Similarly, the furor about NSA spying on email and related communication activity that followed Edward Snowden’s leaks underscores how
much “confidential” information Americans commit to digital memory.
The framers were probably up-to-date on technological innovations of
their time that affected law practice in general and litigation in particular,
and they probably also marveled at how much practice had changed in their
lifetimes. But when they talked about the burdens of discovery, they spoke
mainly of the intrusion it threatened.160 In the age before the photocopier
and the electronic typewriter, the quantity of documents that existed by the
1970s would not be imaginable. The mass use of computers since the 1980s
has compounded the amount of possibly discoverable information
manyfold. And things continue to change; a 2013 survey of in-house counsel
reported that nearly all expect e-discovery to be different in 2015.161
Unless one entirely rejects the proportionality notions explored above,162
this change must affect how discovery is conducted. If predictive coding
achieves reliability and acceptance, it may in a sense supplant the Rule 34
request, for the real focus will be on the algorithm, not the request, and the
undertaking will be to produce information identified by the algorithm, not
on producing “each and every” item described by the request.163 Already,
courts are beginning to require parties to agree on search terms used to
identify responsive information, seemingly recognizing that at least this
“first cut” technique is essential to sensible discovery in the Digital Age.164
We have not seen the end of this evolution.
160
161

See Subrin, supra note 4, at 721-22 (describing concerns).
ARI KAPLAN, ADVICE FROM COUNSEL: TRENDS THAT WILL CHANGE E-DISCOVERY
(AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM NOW) 4 (2013), available at http://www.legaltechnology.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/whitepaper-2013-advice-from-counsel_FINAL.pdf (reporting that nearly all
in-house legal professionals interviewed in a survey expect “e-discovery to be different in 2015”).
162 See supra Section III.B.
163 On this score, consider the recent observation by an experienced e-discovery practitioner:
In effect, requesting parties regard an agreement to use queries as an agreement to
treat those queries as requests for production. Producing parties who reject this
thinking would nevertheless be wise to plan for opponents (and judges) who embrace it.
Craig Ball, Are Keywords Just Filters?, L. TECH. NEWS, June 1, 2013, at 25, available at LEXIS.
164 See, e.g., William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D.
134, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This Opinion should serve as a wake-up call to the Bar in this District
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But we can see that the advent of the Digital Age makes it more important to take account of proportionality concerns. That may be expressing
itself first with regard to preservation. For reasons that are not entirely
clear, preservation has become an extremely hot topic in litigation. As the
person responsible for the discovery volumes of Federal Practice & Procedure,
I have the pleasure each year of reading all reported federal discoveryrelated decisions, and I can report that the volume of sanctions motions
regarding preservation has surged. As the Federal Judicial Center has
reported,165 there are still few decisions imposing severe sanctions for loss of
evidence. Partly due to advertising efforts by vendors of preservation
software, however, those decisions get a great deal of attention, and reports
of extremely broad and expensive preservation abound. Partly as a result,
the pending amendments package contains a proposed amendment to Rule
37 designed to guide preservation sanctions decisions. 166 The ultimate
upshot of this effort cannot be predicted now. Similarly, it is not possible to
say whether further rule changes will result from the advent of the Digital
Age, but it is clear that this new era has produced a new discovery atmosphere.
B. The Rest of the World
“[A] lot of foreign companies like the U.S. judicial system. They like it for its openness,
its fairness, and its vigorous discovery rules.”
—John Bace167

The above endorsement of American discovery is jarring; from what we
are regularly told, foreign companies do not embrace our “vigorous discovery
rules.” To the contrary, the conventional view is that most of the rest of the
world regards U.S. discovery as anathema. It is certainly possible to argue

about the need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and cooperation with opposing counsel
in designing search terms or ‘keywords’ to be used to produce email and other electronically stored
information.”).
165 See EMERY G. LEE III, FED. J UDICIAL C TR., MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS BASED
UPON SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES (2011) (reporting on review of court dockets
showing very low frequency of imposition of sanctions for spoliation).
166 See COMM. ON RULES , PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93, at 314-28. Note that this
proposal was revised after the public comment period.
167 Cope with Complex Asian Issues Affecting E-Discovery by Using a Full-Service Provider, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2013, at 14.
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that the rest of the world is wrong; there is an entire book by a Korean
scholar making just that argument.168
For a long time, partly due to our exceptional discovery practices, the
United States has practiced exceptionalism in procedure.169 Particularly in
relation to discovery, we may have to reconsider that parochial attitude. For
some, the assumption seems to be that God granted the broadest of discovery, or at least that broad discovery is a critical attribute of a civilized
nation. Undoubtedly it has become a striking feature of this nation, but
largely because of the revolution wrought by the framers of the Federal
Rules. Fervent efforts to preserve this status quo seem somewhat like efforts
to preserve every aspect of the “social contract” in Western European
nations where it has come under stress.170
Except in times of global warming, it is risky to set up camp in front of a
glacier, for halting the progress of a glacier is too difficult.171 The “American
century” is over; at least some compromise with the prevailing attitude
toward discovery in the rest of the world is worth considering. It is striking
that some who otherwise oppose American unilateralism and exceptionalism
in many areas embrace it with regards to discovery, thinking that our view is
close to our essence as a people.172 Even if one fully embraces that notion, it
168 See KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW (2003) (recommending that civil law countries adopt American-style discovery). For ruminations along the same
lines, see R.L. Marcus, Extremism in the Pursuit of Truth Is Our “Virtue”: The American Infatuation
With Broad Discovery (exploring reasons why American discovery fits American litigation’s emphasis
on private enforcement), in TRUTH AND EFFICIENCY IN CIVIL LITIGATION: FUNDAMENTAL
ASPECTS OF FACT-FINDING AND EVIDENCE-TAKING IN A COMPARITIVE CONTEXT 165-87
(C.H. van Rhee & A. Uzelac eds., 2012).
169 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized
Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005) (review essay); Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American
Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & C OMP. L.
153 (1999).
170 Consider the following description of the current condition in France:

The Socialists have become a conservative party, desperately trying to preserve the
victories of the last century. Many in the party, like the anti-globalization campaigner
Arnaud Montebourg, now the minister in charge of industrial renewal—let alone
those further to the left—seem to believe that France would be fine if only the rest
of the world would just disappear, or at least work a little less hard.
Steven Erlanger, A Proud Nation Ponders How to Halt Its Slow Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013,
at A6.
171 Perhaps global warming will create a different risk—that huge chunks of ice will peel off
the melting glacier and crush those in the vicinity.
172 This perspective can be supported by reference to a number of political theories. For
discussion, see Richard Marcus, Bomb Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic Values—A New Path
to Procedural Harmonization?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 497-506 (2013) (exploring various
justifications in political theory for retaining American procedural arrangements).
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is difficult to believe that proportionality really goes out the window in
service to the overriding importance of discovery at any cost. If the attitude
toward preservation that some plaintiffs’ lawyers endorse for corporate
defendants were applied also to individual plaintiffs, many of them would
be found wanting. Some swords have two edges.
More immediately, American discovery and attendant preservation are
coming under increasing foreign pressure in the name of privacy. The
Snowden disclosures have called to the attention of the larger electorate a
dissonance between the U.S. attitude and the E.U. attitude toward privacy
that has for some time bubbled in the background of American discovery.
Increasingly, E.U. privacy directives forbid “processing” of digital data that
American preservation law encourages or requires. Needless to say, actual
production of the information also offends the E.U. privacy directives.
It is easy to inveigh against these European attitudes. Thus, two American plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote an article entitled Hiding Across the Atlantic,
warning that “[a]n American company that disseminates defective products
in the United States, where we have liberal discovery rules, may attempt to
hide behind the narrower foreign laws that protect an associated entity to
prevent important discovery.”173 They argue that “[t]he plaintiff bar should
be aware of this pernicious tactic and be armed with a strategy for a strong
response.”174
But it is not so easy for enterprises that operate in both the United
States and the European Union to shrug off the European attitude toward
privacy.175 One can ascribe the difference to the European experience with
totalitarianism in the twentieth century, but that does not make it go away;
even general interest publications have focused on it.176 Thus, American
corporations increasingly have a position called “chief privacy officer” whose
job is attending to the legal requirements around the globe that corporations
doing business in various countries adhere to their differing versions of
privacy. Although some may regard “multinational” as an epithet,177 it seems
173
174
175

Ellen Relkin & Elizabeth O. Breslin, Hiding Across the Atlantic, TRIAL, June 2012, at 14.
Id.
Twenty years ago, Professor Burbank examined the sometimes unhappy history of American receptivity to the procedural attitudes of other countries. See Stephen B. Burbank, The
Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103 (1994).
176 See, e.g., Charles Batchelor, Transatlantic Tensions Cast a Pall Over Data Sharing, FIN.
TIMES, June 1, 2012, at 3 (describing the tensions between the E.U. data protection directives and
the U.S. Patriot Act).
177 Cf. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2852 n.1 (2011)
(“Respondents portray Goodyear USA’s structure [including foreign subsidiaries] as a reprehensi-
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that we will have to adjust to companies doing business across borders. And
legal institutions are beginning to take note as well.178
This is not to say that American procedure should be revised to match
the procedures of other nations,179 but it does recognize that much that is
distinctive about American procedure—not only broad discovery but also
relaxed pleading and class actions (as fortified by rule amendment in
1966)—derives from what the framers did. The framers probably did not
look beyond our shores (except for an occasional glance to England), but
that attitude seems harder to justify in the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
“Our procedural ancestors discussed discovery problems, but rejected most of the
solutions. This may now be a luxury we cannot afford.”
—Stephen Subrin180

As we commune with the shades of the framers, we are also contemplating
another set of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules regarding discovery.181 Edward Bellamy was looking for utopia, and he found it in his
imaginary twenty-first century. Although it has been said that the framers
of the Federal Rules “held a utopian combination of hopes about the gains
from discovery,”182 as hard-headed lawyers they likely did not expect utopia
to emerge by now. Bellamy posited a twenty-first century world in which
human conflict had disappeared because humans had evolved beyond it.
Being litigators, the framers probably did not even entirely want the world
ble effort to ‘outsource’ all manufacturing, and correspondingly, tort litigation, to foreign
jurisdictions. Yet Turkey, where the tire alleged to have caused the accident-in-suit was made, is
hardly a strange location for a facility that primarily supplies markets in Europe and Asia.”)
(citations omitted).
178 For example, in December 2011, the Sedona Conference issued a draft set of recommended
procedures for accommodating American discovery and E.U. privacy directives. See THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE &
DATA PROTECTION: BEST P RACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION DISCOVERY OF PROTECTED DATA IN U.S. LITIGATION
(2011), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/sites/sedona.civicactions.net/files/
private/drupal/filesys/publications/IntlPrinciples2011.pdf.
179 That is the point of Marcus, Bomb Throwing, supra note 172.
180 Subrin, supra note 4, at 745.
181 See COMM. ON RULES , PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 93.
182 Glaser, supra note 79, at 234. Glaser noted in the 1960s that “[p]art of their hopes has been
fulfilled,” but also that trials did not diminish in number despite discovery, as the framers hoped.
Id. Perhaps the more recent and considerable decline in the trial rate would reassure them on this
score as well.
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to move beyond human conflict, and they almost certainly did not expect it
would do so.
We live in the actual twenty-first century, and we know that human
conflict has not stopped. We may therefore need to confront the question of
whether we can still afford the “luxury” of postponing solutions to discovery
problems. This Essay has identified four varieties of litigation that have
been important since the framers did their work but probably did not exist
at that time.183 It has also noted the two seemingly new ideas about discovery that have emerged in the last seventy-five years,184 and two important
forces that have emerged since the framers did their work.185 Meanwhile, as
Professor Yeazell has recently noted, the contest about procedural reform
often seems to degenerate into somewhat cartoonish posing with “[s]ome
view[ing] civil litigation as the vindicator of rights, a way of speaking truth
to power, and a guarantor of democratic values and freedoms. Others see
civil litigation as a deadweight loss, a stick in the wheels of commerce, and a
source of national shame.”186 For those who seek actual reforms of the
American litigation system, the challenge is to navigate between Scylla and
Charybdis, and “reforming” discovery is likely to remain a central activity.
I began by asking whether the framers would be disconcerted by the actual
twenty-first century as Edward Bellamy probably would have been had he
been able to visit it. I suspect they might find some things striking and
possibly unnerving, but they would not find current litigation realities
nearly so surprising. Let us try to live up to their example as we move forward.
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185
186

See supra Part II.
See supra Sections III.A–B.
See supra Sections IV.A–B.
Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two
Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1754 (2013).

